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SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS-A DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO DISCLOSURE OF A
STATE'S CONFIDENTIAL CHILD
ABUSE RECORDS
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,' the United States Supreme Court se-
verely limited a defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him. 2 A plurality of the Court3 explained that the
confrontation clause provides a defendant the right to physically
face and cross-examine those who testify against him.4 In Davis v.
Alaska,5 the Supreme Court held that this right to cross-examination
was violated by a trial court's order prohibiting reference to a wit-
ness' juvenile police record.6 The Supreme Court in Ritchie, how-
ever, refused to extend Davis to provide a defendant pre-trial access
to confidential child abuse records for the impeachment of a wit-
ness' testimony.7 The right to confront one's accusers, the Court
concluded, is a trial right that is satisfied whenever a defendant has
an opportunity to cross-examine a witness free of statutory or court-
imposed restrictions.8
A majority of the Ritchie Court,9 however, held that the defend-
ant was entitled to the disclosure of material information contained
1 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
2 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides, in relevant part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
4 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998 (plurality opinion). See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985)(per curiam).
5 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
6 Id. at 318-20. The trial court's order was granted pursuant to an Alaska state stat-
ute. Id. at 311.
7 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun did not join the
Court's discussion of the confrontation clause.
8 Id. at 999-1000 (plurality opinion).
9 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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within such a confidential file under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 10 The Court noted that although a defend-
ant is entitled to discover exculpatory information from the govern-
ment, the defendant may not make the sole determination of what
evidence is to be disclosed. 1' The Court recognized the compelling
state interest in retaining the confidentiality of child abuse investiga-
tive files. 12 Rather than breaching this interest in confidentiality, the
majority remanded the case and instructed the trial court to review
the confidential file in camera and to release any material evidence
to the defendant. 13
This Note examines the Ritchie opinions and concludes that the
plurality's refusal to grant disclosure under the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment represents an unjustified restriction of that
constitutional guarantee. This Note argues that the confrontation
clause should encompass pre-trial events that have an adverse effect
on a defendant's ability to cross-examine witnesses at trial. Further-
more, this Note contends that the confrontation clause contem-
plates inquiries into the potential effectiveness of the opportunity
for cross-examination to assure the defendant has a meaningful op-
portunity to impeach a witness' testimony.1 4 Finally, this Note sug-
gests that the Court properly remanded the case for an in camera
review but should have limited the scope of the procedure to a
search for any inconsistent prior statements of the witness.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June of 1979, George Ritchie was charged with rape, invol-
untary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a mi-
nor.15 Ritchie's alleged victim was his thirteen-year-old daughter,
who claimed that the sexual attacks had occurred at a rate of two to
three times a week over a four-year period. 16 The charges against
Ritchie stemmed from an attack on June 11, 1979, when the daugh-
ter was taken to the police by an aunt. 17 The daughter's case was
10 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001-02. The fourteenth amendment due process clause
states in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003.
12 Id. at 1003-04.
13 Id. at 1003. The majority stated that "[w]e find that Ritchie's interest (as well as
that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring
that the ... files be submitted only to the trial court for in camera review." Id.
14 See id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 994.
16 Id.
17 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. 557, 560, 472 A.2d 220, 222 (1984),
af'd, 509 Pa. 357, 502 A.2d 148 (1985), rev'd in part 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
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subsequently turned over to Children and Youth Services (CYS).18
In the course of preparing his defense, Ritchie served CYS with
a subpoena requesting access to the agency's file on his daughter's
case.' 9 CYS denied Ritchie and his attorney access to the file on the
basis of the file's confidentiality. 20 Records compiled by CYS in the
investigation of child abuse cases are privileged under Pennsylvania
law, subject to several statutory exceptions. 2' One such confidenti-
ality exception permits CYS to disclose reports to "[a] court of com-
petent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order."'22
At a pre-trial hearing held in chambers, Ritchie moved to have
CYS sanctioned for the agency's failure to provide access to the sub-
poenaed records. 23 Ritchie argued that the records were necessary
to his defense because they might contain the names of witnesses,
medical records, and other unspecified evidence that would enable
him to impeach or discredit the complainant. 24 The trial judge,
however, relied upon CYS' representation that there were no medi-
18 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994. Children Youth Services (hereinafter CYS) is a protec-
tive service agency established by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to investigate
cases of suspected child abuse and neglect. Id. The Agency was formerly designated as
Child Welfare Services (CWS). Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. at 360 n.4, 502 A.2d
at 149 n.4.
19 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994. Ritchie requested any contents of the file concerning the
charges against him and records allegedly made in 1978 after CYS conducted an investi-
gation of potential child abuse against his daughter. Id. Although the earlier investiga-
tion occurred during the time period in which the attacks allegedly took place, no
criminal charges stemming from the earlier investigation were filed against Ritchie. Id.
at n.1.
20 Id. at 994.
21 Id.
22 At the time of trial, the Pennsylvania statute provided:
(a) [R]eports made pursuant to this act including but not limited to report summa-
ries of child abuse . . .and written reports . . . as well as any other information
obtained, reports written or photographs or x-rays taken concerning alleged in-
stances of child abuse in the possession of the department, a county public child
welfare agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be
made available to:
(1) A duly authorized official of a child protective service in the course of his
official duties.
(2) A physician examining or treating a child or the director or a person specifi-
cally designated in writing by such director of any hospital or other medical institu-
tion where a child is being treated ....
(3) A guardian ad litem for the child.
(4) A duly authorized official of the department ....
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215 (Purdon Supp. 1975).
The law has subsequently been amended to provide further disclosure to the Penn-
sylvania Attorney General, county commissioners, and various law enforcement officials.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
23 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995.
24 Id. The medical records requested by Ritchie were allegedly compiled during the
1978 CYS investigation. Id. See supra note 19.
1016 [Vol. 78
DISCLOSURE OF CHILD ABUSE RECORDS
cal records contained in the record. 25 The trial judge denied the
motion to sanction CYS and declined to order the Agency to pro-
vide access to its file.2 6
At trial, the commonwealth's main witness was Ritchie's daugh-
ter.27 Defense counsel was given the opportunity to impeach her
testimony during cross-examination. 28 The trial court placed few
limitations on the scope of cross-examination, allowing defense
counsel to question the daughter on all aspects of the alleged at-
tacks and her motivation for not reporting the abuse earlier.29 At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Ritchie guilty on all counts
and the court sentenced him to three to ten years imprisonment.30
Ritchie appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, contending that CYS' failure to disclose the contents of the
file violated his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against
him.3' The superior court agreed that his right of confrontation had
been violated3 2 and, accordingly, vacated the judgment and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.3 3 The court held, how-
ever, that the commonwealth's interest in confidentiality
outweighed Ritchie's right to obtain specific material not relevant to
the charges against him.3 4 The superior court instructed the trial
court on remand to review the record in camera3 5 to determine if
25 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995. The trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed
the entire CYS file. In fact, he indicated that he had not read 50 pages or more of the
CYS record. Id. at n.3.
26 Id. at 995. The trial court issued an order stating that "the [c]ourt finds that no
medical records are being held by the Child Welfare Services that would be to the bene-
fit of the defendant in this case." Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. at 360, 502 A.2d at
149.
27 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995.
28 Id.
29 Id. The only limitations imposed by the trial judge were routine evidentiary rul-
ings. Id.
30 Id.
31 Commonwealth v.Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. at 564-65, 472 A.2d at 224. The sixth
amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
The sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
32 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. at 565, 472 A.2d at 225.
33 Id. at 568, 472 A.2d at 226.
34 Id. at 565, 472 A.2d at 225.
35 In camera is defined as "in chambers." In an in camera inspection, a trial judge
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they contained any statements made by the daughter regarding the
abuse and to disclose any such statements.8 6 If no such statements
were contained in the files, the trial court was instructed to reinstate
the original sentence.3 7 Additionally, the superior court indicated
that although the CYS record was confidential, counsel should be
allowed access to the file in order to argue the relevance of any
statements released by the reviewing judge.38 If the trial court held
that the statements were relevant or that the error in denying access
was not harmless, the superior court contended that the defendant
should be granted a new trial.8 9
On appeal by the commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania agreed that the denial of access to the CYS file violated
Ritchie's sixth amendment rights.40 The court concluded that the
commonwealth's interest in the confidentiality of the records did
not outweigh the defendant's right to effectively confront and cross-
examine witnesses. 4 1 The in camera review favored by the superior
court was rejected as insufficient because such a review "den[ies] the
opportunity to have the files reviewed with the eyes and perspective
of an advocate."'42 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial
will "inspect a document which counsel wishes to use at trial in his chambers before
ruling on its admissibility or its use." BLACK's LAW DICTONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
36 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. at 567-68,472 A.2d at 226. These state-
ments were to be made available to Ritchie's counsel who would then have the opportu-
nity to argue that the statements could have been used to impeach the witness'
testimony. The commonwealth would then be permitted to argue that the failure to
provide counsel with these statements at trial was harmless error. Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. This right of inspection was limited, however. The court stated that counsel's
access was strictly for the purpose of arguing relevance and that counsel was "otherwise
bound by the confidential nature of the material in the record." Id.
39 Id.
40 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 502 A.2d 148 (1985).
41 Id. at 367, 502 A.2d at 153. The court also stated that "[w]hen materials gathered
become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional
right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." Id. The court ana-
lyzed Ritchie's sixth amendment rights generally without separately analyzing the con-
frontation and compulsory process clause components. In fact, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not fully develop a compulsory process clause analysis. In the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Powell chose to apply the docirine of compulsory process under a
fourteenth amendment due process analysis rather than under the sixth amendment. See
infra text accompanying notes 87-97 for a discussion ofJustice Powell's treatment of the
compulsory process clause.
42 Id. at 367, 502 A.2d at 153. The court was not entirely unsympathetic to the pri-
vacy concerns of CYS. It cautioned that the trial court should take "appropriate steps to
insure against the improper dissemination of sensitive material gleaned from the files."
Id. at 368 n.16, 502 A.2d at 153 n.16 (citing In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494
Pa. 15, 28-29, 428 A.2d 126, 132-33 (1981)). Suggested steps in protecting file confi-
dentiality included "fashioning of appropriate protective orders, or conducting the pro-
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court so that Ritchie's counsel could be granted access to the file.43
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 44 to deter-
mine if a state's interest in the confidentiality of its child abuse in-
vestigation files outweighed a criminal defendant's right under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments to discover favorable evidence
contained in those files.4 5
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:
AN OVERVIEW
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, in relevant part, that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ... ,"46 As the Supreme Court explained in Mattox v.
United States:
The primary object of the [confrontation clause] ... was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in
lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollec-
tion and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.4 7
The Court has emphasized that the primary interest secured by this
right of face-to-face confrontation is an "adequate opportunity for
cross-examination. ' 48
Generally, cases arising under the confrontation clause have
fallen into two broad categories: "cases involving the admission of
out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by
law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination. '" 49
ceedings in camera." Id. at 368 n.16, 502 A.2d at 153 n.16 (citing In re Pittsburgh Action
Against Rape, 494 Pa. at 28-29, 428 A.2d at 132-83).
43 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. at 367-68, 502 A.2d at 153. At this point, the
parties would have the opportunity to argue the relevance of presenting evidence ob-
tained from the file or the harmlessness of the trial court's error in preventing access.
Id. at 368, 502 A.2d at 153-54.
44 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 106 S. Ct. 2244 (1986).
45 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994.
46 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See supra note 31 for the text of the sixth amendment.
47 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
48 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). Cross-examination in a criminal
trial proceeding is crucial to the reliability of the outcome. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 405 (1965). The Court recently stated in Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658
(1987), that "[tihe right to cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause,
thus is essentially a 'functional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding
functions of a criminal trial." Id. at 2662.
49 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985)(per curiam). The Court in Fensterer
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Cases involving the introduction of hearsay evidence exemplify the
first category of confrontation clause cases. For instance, the de-
fendant's confrontation right was violated in Pointer v. Texas 50 when
the prosecution introduced a transcript of pre-trial testimony with-
out affording the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. 51 These cases, however, do not ultimately conclude that all
hearsay evidence violates the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
The Court has recognized exceptions, such as in Ohio v. Roberts,52 in
which an out-of-court statement by an unavailable witness satisfied
the demands of the confrontation clause because defense counsel
fully cross-examined the witness at the time the statement was
made.53
In the second category of cases, the defendant's right to con-
front his accusers is violated by restrictions placed on the scope of
cross-examination either by operation of law or by a trial court's
rulings. The Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska 54 is an excellent il-
lustration of this second category. In Davis, a court order issued
pursuant to a state statute prohibiting the admission of juvenile po-
lice records precluded the defendant from demonstrating the wit-
ness' bias during cross-examination. 55 The Court held that the
inability to question the witness regarding his source of bias com-
rejected the confrontation clause claim because "[t]his case falls in neither category."
Id. at 19. The Fensterer defendant alleged that his rights under the confrontation clause
were violated when his attempt to cross-examine an expert witness was impeded by the
expert's failure to recall the underlying tests on which he had based his conclusion. Id.
at 17-18. The Court held that in such cases the defendant's rights are unaffected be-
cause "the factfinder can observe the witness' demeanor under cross-examination, and
the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the accused." Id. at 20. The
Court determined that the defendant adequately demonstrated the witness' loss of
memory to the jury and impeached the witness' conclusion through the testimony of his
own expert witnesses. Id.
50 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
51 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1967)(confrontation
clause violated because admitted out-of-court testimony not subject to pre-trial cross-
examination).
52 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
53 Id. at 70-73. Similarly, the Court concluded in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970), that the defendant's confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admis-
sion of prior inconsistent statements made by the witness "as long as the declarant is
testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination." Id. at 158. In
fact, the Court in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1985), held that the admis-
sion of testimony of a deceased witness from a previous trial did not violate the confron-
tation clause if "[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the
prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination." Id.
54 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
55 Id. at 311-14.
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promised the defendant's sixth amendment rights.56 Similarly, in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall,57 the trial court prohibited the defendant
from questioning a witness about the state's dismissal of pending
charges against the latter in exchange for the witness' promise to
discuss the case against the defendant with the prosecutor.58 The
Court concluded that "[b]y thus cutting off all questioning about an
event . . . that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the
witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the
trial court's ruling violated respondent's right secured by the Con-
frontation Clause." 59
IV. JUSTICE POWELL'S MAJORITY AND PLURALITY OPINIONS
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, in which the Court affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's ruling that Ritchie was entitled to know whether relevant
information existed in the CYS file. 60 The Court, therefore, re-
manded the case for further proceedings. 61 A plurality of the Court,
however, disagreed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding
that Ritchie's rights under the sixth amendment confrontation
clause did not guarantee him access to tYS' records. 62 Rather, us-
ing a due process analysis, the majority held that relevant informa-
tion contained in the file should be given to the defendant only
when the information is material to his defense. 63 In order to pre-
serve the commonwealth's interest in protecting the confidentiality
of the CYS file, this right of review was limited by the majority to an
in camera inspection of the file by the trial court.64
56 Id. at 318. The impeachment of the witness' testimony was critical to the defend-
ant's case. The juvenile witness was on probation for burglary at the time of trial. The
defense argued that the witness' testimony could be affected by the fear that he might be
suspected of participating in the crime. The defense contended that the witness was
under pressure from the police and identified the defendant out of fear of potential
probation revocation. Id. at 311.
57 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
58 Id. at 1434.
59 Id. at 1435.
60 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004. The Court's opinion was joined in full by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist andJustices White and O'Connor and in part byJustice Blackmun. Id. at 994.
Justice Blackmunjoined in all but the plurality's discussion of the sixth amendment con-
frontation clause. Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See infra notes 107-24 and
accompanying text for a discussion ofJustice Blackmun's concurring decision.
61 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004.
62 Id. at 1000 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell was joined in his plurality opinion by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor.
63 Id. at 1002.
64 Id. at 1004.
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A. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
Initially, the majority addressed Ritchie's claim that the Court
lacked proper jurisdiction. 65 Ritchie argued that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision was not a "final judgment or decree." 66
Justice Powell observed that, ordinarily, judgments are not final if
state courts must conduct further proceedings before the federal is-
sues are resolved. 67 However, he also contended that the principles
of finality have not been construed rigidly. 68 Justice Powell focused
on the Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,69 which rec-
ognized that there are at least four scenarios in which jurisdiction
would be proper despite the existence of further state proceed-
ings. 70 He noted that the Court in Cox Broadcasting stated that one
such exception exists " 'where the federal claim has been finally de-
cided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had,
whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.' "71
Justice Powell concluded that Ritchie fell under this exception
because the sixth amendment issue would not survive the proceed-
ings on remand. 72 The constitutional issue, he determined, would
65 Id. at 996.
66 Id. The finality doctrine is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), which states in
relevant part:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(3) By writ of certiorari.... where the validity of a State statute is drawn in ques-
tion on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States ....
67 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 996. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v.Johnson, 326 U.S. 120,
123-27 (1945)("[Ilt has been a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system not to
permit an appeal until all litigation has been concluded in the court of first instance.");
Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945)("Finality must be
in two senses: it must be subject to no further review or correction in any other state
tribunal; it must also be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not
merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein."). Ritchie contended that the judg-
ment in this case was not final because additional proceedings were to be conducted in
the Pennsylvania courts. Ritchie noted that at a minimum the trial court must conduct
an in camera review of the file and hear arguments by the parties as to whether the
failure to disclose the contents of the files constituted prejudicial error. If the trial court
found the error to be prejudicial, Ritchie would be granted a new trial. Ritchie further
explained that because the sixth amendment issue might yet become moot, the Court
should not review the claim until all proceedings in the Pennsylvania courts were com-
pleted. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 996.
68 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 996.
69 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
70 Id. at 477.
71 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 996 (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 481).
72 Id. at 996-97. Justice Powell discussed three procedural situations and concluded
that the sixth amendment issue would be resolved and that the commonwealth would be
1022 [Vol. 78
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be moot since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already decided
the sixth amendment question in favor of Ritchie. 73 He concluded
that without Supreme Court review, the Commonwealth's interest
in the file's confidentiality would be irreparably lost.74 The major-
ity, therefore, rejected Ritchie's claim that the Court lacked proper
jurisdiction. 75
unable to raise the issue on appeal. Id. In scenario one, if on remand the trial court
found that the nondisclosure was harmless or that the file did not contain relevant infor-
mation, the judgment would be reinstated and the commonwealth would have no basis
on which to seek an appeal. Justice Powell maintained that even if Ritchie appealed his
conviction under this scenario, the constitutional claim would be preserved only if the
commonwealth filed a cross-petition. Id. at 997. He noted that in the past the Court has
considered cases in this procedural posture to be sufficiently final. Id. See e.g., New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 n.1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 n.6
(1983).
Under scenario two, if the trial court found the nondisclosure to be prejudicial and
if upon retrial the commonwealth prevailed on the merits, the same conditions as scena-
rio one would result. Similarly, if Ritchie prevailed, the commonwealth would be pre-
cluded from appeal by the double jeopardy clause. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997. See
California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 498 n.71 (1966)(decided with Miranda v. Arizona).
Justice Powell recognized a third scenario, suggested by Justice Stevens in his dis-
sent in Ritchie. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997 n.7. See infra note 154 for an analysis ofJustice
Stevens' position. In this scenario, if the trial court found prejudicial error, the com-
monwealth could take an immediate appeal of the order. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.,
PA. R.A.P., Rule 311 (a)(5)(Purdon Supp. 1987). Justice Powell noted the dissent's argu-
ment that the claim is not final because the commonwealth could raise the sixth amend-
ment issue once again on appeal. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997 n.7. However, Justice Powell
was unpersuaded that the constitutional issues would necessarily survive for the Court's
review. Id. For instance, the superior court could reverse and find the nondisclosure
harmless, thus preventing further review. In the alternative, if the superior court agreed
that the error was prejudicial, the court would allow the commonwealth to again raise
the sixth amendment issue. Justice Powell argued that in order to reach the Supreme
Court, the commonwealth would have to raise an appeal at each level of the Penn-
sylvania court system. Such an approach, in his estimation, would be wastful because
the issue had been definitively decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. He
concluded that in this situation "the justifications for the finality doctrine--efficiency,
judicial restraint, and federalism-would be ill served by another round of litigation on
an issue that has been authoratatively decided by the highest state court." Id. (citation
omitted).
73 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 997 n.7.
74 Id. at 997. Justice Powell observed that although this concern is not dispositive of
the jurisdiction issue, the Court has concluded that" 'statutorily created finality require-
ments should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be
lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.'" Id. at 997-98 (quoting Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.l1 (1976)).
75 Id. at 998. Justice Powell distinguished Ritchie from the Court's decision in United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971). Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998 n.8. He noted that the
Ryan Court refused to review a district court's denial of the respondent's motion to
quash a subpoena of business records. Id. Justice Powell explained that the Ryan Court
had rejected the respondent's assertion that an immediate review was necessary to avoid
disclosing protected materials because the respondent had the option of finalizing the
issue by ignoring the subpoena. Id.
The Ritchie majority observed that the Ryan Court's concern with the" 'necessity for
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B. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Justice Powell, representing a plurality of the Court, rejected
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the con-
frontation clause. 76 He initially observed that the confrontation
clause provides two types of protections for defendants: the right to
confront witnesses and the right to conduct cross-examination. 77
Justice Powell distinguished Ritchie's claim from these two basic
protections because Ritchie did not allege that he was denied the
opportunity to confront or cross-examine his daughter. 78 The plu-
rality stressed that the confrontation clause does not apply to allega-
tions that the defendant was denied the opportunity to effectively
cross-examine the witness. 79
The plurality observed that in accepting Ritchie's argument, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied in part on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska.80 In Davis, the
Supreme Court held that a trial judge's restriction of the question-
ing of a witness regarding his juvenile criminal record represented a
violation of the confrontation clause.8 ' Justice Powell refused to ex-
expedition in the administration of the criminal law' . . . would be undermined if all
pretrial orders were immediately appealable." Id. (quoting Ryan, 402 U.S. at 533). The
Court's implicit assumption in Ryan, Justice Powell contended, was that unless the party
opposing discovery was willing to be held in contempt, the issue was not important
enough to justify interrupting the proceeding for an appeal. Ritchie was different, Justice
Powell explained, because the trial had concluded, and, therefore, the interest in expe-
diting criminal proceedings would not be undermined. The majority maintained that
judicial economy would be enhanced by hearing the present appeal rather than by re-
quiring Ritchie to raise fruitless appeals in the Pennsylvania courts. Id.
76 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun did not join in this
portion of the opinion and filed a separate concurring opinion. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 107-124.
77 Id. at 998 (plurality opinion)(citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)(per
curiam)).
78 Id. at 998 (plurality opinion).
79 Id. at 998-99 (plurality opinion). Ritchie argued that he did have the opportunity
to cross-examine his daughter but that his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses
was nonetheless undermined. He contended that without access to the CYS file he
could not effectively question her during cross-examination. Id. at 998 (plurality opin-
ion). Ritchie asserted that access to the file would have enabled him to establish weak-
nesses in her testimony and to discredit her. Id. at 998-99 (plurality opinion). See Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1974)(reference to restricted juvenile police records
during cross-examination is necessary to impeach witness' reliability). Because im-
peachment of key witnesses will often determine the outcome of a case, Ritchie con-
cluded that by denying him the opportunity to effectively cross-examine and impeach
the witness, his sixth amendment rights had been violated. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999
(plurality opinion). See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)("The jury's estimate
of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence ....").
80 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
81 Id. at 318-20. The Court found this restriction to be a sixth amendment violation
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tend Davis to compel discovery of privileged information whenever
a defendant asserts a need before trial to review such information
for the purpose of impeaching a witness' testimony at trial.8 2 Such
an extension, inJustice Powell's estimation, would effectively trans-
form the confrontation clause into a rule of pre-trial discovery de-
spite the Court's earlier rulings to the contrary.8 3 He stated,
instead, that" 'the Confrontation Clause only guarantees an opportu-
nity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is ef-
fective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might
wish.' "84 The plurality contended that the constitutional violation
in Davis stemmed not from the confidentiality of the records but
rather from the restriction of defense counsel's ability " 'to expose
to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' "85 In Ritchie,
Justice Powell concluded, the right to confrontation would have
been violated if the trial judge had restricted defense counsel's
cross-examination of the daughter, but it was not violated because
CYS refused to disclose its file.8 6
despite the state's legitimate interest in the confidentiality of its juvenile criminal
records. Id.
82 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion).
83 Id. Justice Powell indicated that the confrontation clause provides merely a trial
right designed to prevent restrictions improperly limiting the scope of questions posed
during cross-examination. Id. (plurality opinion). See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970)("It is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms
the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 725 (1968)("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."). For a dis-
cussion of Green and Barber see infra text accompanying notes 185-94.
84 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion)(quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 20 (1985)(per curiam)(emphasis in original)). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 73 n.12 (1980)(should not inquire into effectiveness of cross-examination except in
the most extraordinary of circumstances). In Fensterer, the Court found that the ac-
cused's right to confrontation was not implicated because the "trial court did not limit
the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." Fensterer, 474
U.S. at 19. For a discussion of Fensterer, see supra note 49. Justice Powell further con-
tended that Fensterer was in complete accord with the Court's earlier decisions in which it
found a confrontation clause violation only if there was a statutory or court-imposed
infringement on the scope of questioning. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000 (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986)(restriction of questioning about
a potential source for witness' bias violates confrontation clause); Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 318 (1974)(restriction on reference to juvenile police record of witness inter-
feres with defendant's ability to effectively cross-examine); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973)(inability to impeach own witness who recanted earlier admissions de-
prives defendant of a fair trial); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968)(restriction of ques-
tions regarding a witness' true identity violates the defendant's sixth amendment rights);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 4,15 (1965)(inability to cross-examine co-defendant vio-
lates confrontation clause).
85 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000 (plurality opinion)(quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
86 Id. (plurality opinion).
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C. THE COMPULSORY PROCESS AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
Justice Powell, writing for a majority of the Court, confirmed
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling that nondisclosure of CYS
files violated the sixth amendment's guarantee of compulsory pro-
cess.8 7 After reviewing the sparse history of the compulsory process
clause, the majority concluded that "[o]ur cases establish, at a mini-
mum, that criminal defendants have the right to the Government's
assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at
trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence
the determination of guilt."8 8 Justice Powell observed, however,
that the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the clause
"guarantees the right to discover the identity of witnesses, or to re-
quire the Government to produce exculpatory evidence."8 9 He
noted that the Court has traditionally reviewed such claims under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 0 As such,
Justice Powell refrained from examining Ritchie's claim under the
less certain compulsory process clause framework, but instead eval-
uated the claim under a more traditional due process analysis. 9 '
Justice Powell indicated that it is well settled that the due pro-
cess clause obligates the government to turn over evidence that is
either favorable to the defendant or material to a determination of
his or her guilt.9 2 The majority noted that the Court has deter-
mined that evidence is material if" 'there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
87 Id. Ritchie argued that the failure to disclose the files prohibited him from discov-
ering the names of potentially favorable witnesses and other evidence contained in the
file. Justice Powell noted that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on
compulsory process was unclear, the Pennsylvania court implicitly concluded that the
compulsory process right requires the state's assistance in discovering useful evidence
despite the statutorily created prohibition. Id.
88 Id. at 1001. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Cool v. Unites
States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972)(per curiam); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967);
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. D. Va. 1807)(No. 14,692).
89 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001 (emphasis in original).
90 Id. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963).
91 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001. Justice Powell stated that "[blecause the applicability of
the Sixth Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth
Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a clear
framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for the purposes of this case." Id.
92 Id. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)("[I]f the subject matter...
is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable
to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submit-
ting the problem to the trial judge."); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963)("[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon re-
quest violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or to
punishment.").
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the proceeding would have been different.' "9 Justice Powell, how-
ever, recognized that the Court could not presently determine
whether the CYS file contained material evidence because the par-
ties had been denied access to the file and the trial judge had only
partially reviewed its contents. 94 He rejected the Commonwealth's
contention that the statutory privilege placed an absolute prohibi-
tion on any search for material evidence because the legislature con-
templated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings. 95 The
majority, therefore, affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's de-
cision to remand the case.96 The due process clause, according to
the Court, entitled Ritchie to further review by a trial court to deter-
mine if there existed evidence material to his conviction.97
D. IN CAMERA REVIEW VERSUS COMPLETE DISCLOSURE
The Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie agreed that the defendant
was entitled to material evidence contained in the CYS file. 98 Justice
Powell, however, indicated that this right did "not include the un-
93 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opin-
ion of Blackmun,J.,joined by one otherjustice)). A reasonable probability is defined as
"a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 682 (opinion
of Blackmun, J., joined by one other justice).
94 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002. The commonwealth argued that the Court should not
inquire into materiality because the legislature had deemed the file confidential. To
allow disclosure, the commonwealth asserted, would destroy the state's interest in file
confidentiality on mere speculation that the file might contain useful evidence. Id. The
commonwealth pointed out that Ritchie must specifically show what evidence he wishes
disclosed and its materiality. Id. at n.15. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-110
("The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.").
Justice Powell recognized the strong state interest in confidentiality and acknowl-
edged that Ritchie could not require the trial court to search the CYS file without estab-
lishing that the file contained material information. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002 n.15. See
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)("He must at least make
some plausible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and
favorable to his defense."). Justice Powell contended that although the commonwealth's
obligation to disclose exculpatory information contained in the file existed in the ab-
sence of a specific request, "the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request may have a
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclo-
sure." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002 n.15.
95 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215(a)(5)(Purdon Supp.
1987). Because disclosure would be proper when a trial court determined that the file
contained material information,Justice Powell explained, the statute did not provide for
total confidentiality as the commonwealth asserted. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002.
96 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002.
97 Id. Justice Powell noted that upon remand, if the trial court found material infor-
mation, Ritchie should be granted a new trial. Conversely, if the files did not contain
material information or if the nondisclosure was harmless, then Ritchie's conviction




supervised authority to search through the Commonwealth's
files." 99 Although the Court has recognized that "the eye of an ad-
vocate may be helpful" to discovery,100 the majority claimed the
Court "has never held-even in the absence of a statute restricting
disclosure-that a defendant alone may make the determination as
to the materiality of information." 10 1 Justice Powell concluded that
the defendant had no constitutional right to search the common-
wealth's files to determine the relevance of the evidence.10 2
The majority determined that Ritchie's interest in receiving a
fair trial could be adequately protected by submitting the records to
the trial court for an in camera review. 10 3 Justice Powell explained
that although Ritchie would lose the benefit of an "advocate's eye"
in an in camera review, "the trial court's discretion is not un-
bounded."' 1 4 He contended that allowing defense counsel unlim-
ited access to the CYS file would unnecessarily destroy the
commonwealth's compelling interest in the confidentiality of its
child abuse files.' 05 Justice Powell concluded that the risk of the
trial court's failing to recognize some exculpatory evidence did not
warrant interference with the commonwealth's efforts to uncover
and prevent child abuse. 10 6
99 Id. at 1003. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that if the defendant
alleged that the confidential file might contain material evidence, the defendant should
be granted full access to the file in spite of the commonwealth's interest in confidential-
ity. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985).
100 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875
(1966)("The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and effec-
tively be made only by an advocate.").
101 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003. Justice Powell explained that in situations in which the
defendant's request is general in nature, the state decides what information should be
disclosed. He noted that unless the defense became aware of specific material evidence
left undisclosed, the decision to disclose rests exclusively in the prosecution's discretion.
Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
102 Id. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)("There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case ... .
103 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003.
104 Id. Justice Powell noted that if a defendant had knowledge of specific information
contained in the file, such as a medical report, he could request its disclosure and argue
its materiality. Additionally, he indicated that an in camera review should be ongoing,
so that a court could reevaluate the file as the trial developed and release any evidence
as it became material. Id.
105 Id. The majority stressed that file confidentiality would encourage abused children
and other witnesses to come forward and report the crime. The Court noted the possi-
ble adverse effects disclosure would have on Pennsylvania's efforts to combat such
abuse. Id.
106 Id. at 1004.
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V. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Blackmun concurred in its judgment but rejected the
plurality's conclusion that the confrontation clause applies only to
events occurring at trial. 10 7 Justice Blackmun contended that the
mere opportunity to cross-examine a witness would be insufficient if
the defendant were denied the opportunity to effectively cross-ex-
amine the witness.' 0 8 He explained that "[i]f I were to accept the
plurality's effort to divorce confrontation analysis from any exami-
nation into the effectiveness of cross-examination, I believe that in
some situations the confrontation right would become an empty
formality."109
Justice Blackmun distinguished those cases in which the simple
questioning of a witness would satisfy the purposes of cross-exami-
nation from those situations in which questioning alone would be
insufficient and potentially detrimental. 110 Justice Blackmun indi-
cated that the Supreme Court rejected the confrontation clause
claim in Delaware v. Fensterer because that case illustrated an instance
in which simple questioning proved adequate."' He explained that
in Fensterer the defendant asserted that his right to confront was vio-
lated when the prosecution's expert witness could not recall the
method he had used to arrive at his conclusion. 112 The facts of Fen-
sterer, Justice Blackmun contended, demonstrated an instance in
which defense counsel could effectively undermine the witness'
credibility through basic questioning and through the testimony of
other defense experts. 113 Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality's
107 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that "[i]n my view, there
might well be a confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pre-trial access
to information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial prose-
cution witness." Id. (BlackmunJ., concurring). Justice Blackmun also indicated that he
was "in substantial agreement" with Justice Brennan's dissent on the confrontation
clause issue. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion ofJustice Brennan's dis-
sent, see infra text accompanying notes 125-46.
108 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
109 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Blackmun contended that even the plurality
would agree that an important aspect of cross-examination is to cast doubt on a witness'
testimony. In his estimation, the mere opportunity to question "makes little sense set
apart from the goals of cross-examination." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
11o See id. at 1004-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
I I Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,
18 (1985)(per curiam)). See supra note 49 for a description of Fensterer.
112 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(citing Fensterer, 474 U.S. at
17-18 (per curiam)).
118 Id. at 1004-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asserted that the
Fensterer Court did not imply that the confrontation clause was unconcerned with the
effectiveness of cross-examination but rather that "when... simple questioning serves
the purpose of cross-examination, a defendant cannot claim a confrontation violation
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application of Fensterer for the proposition that the confrontation
clause merely referred to the opportunity for cross-examination
rather than the opportunity for effective cross-examination.' 14 Jus-
tice Blackmun recognized that the Fensterer Court stated that " 'the
confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-ex-
amination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'"115
Justice Blackmun contended that Davis v. Alaska 116 represented
an instance in which simple questioning was insufficient." 17
Although the defendant in Davis had access to the witness' juvenile
police record, he could not refer to it while attempting to demon-
strate the witness' potential bias during cross-examination.' 18 The
Davis Court held that questioning, without reference to the witness'
juvenile record, would be useless and potentially harmful to the de-
fendant's case because the jury might view the questioning as a
baseless attack on the credibility of an innocent witness. 119 Justice
Blackmun found that Davis and Ritchie were compellingly similar as
both defendants were limited to simple questioning and prohibited
from referring to specific facts which might have established witness
bias.' 20 Justice Blackmun concluded that a state violates a defend-
ant's right to witness confrontation when the state's effort to protect
confidentiality hinders the defendant's ability to effectively cross-
examine.121
Despite his disagreement with the plurality's narrow reading of
the confrontation clause, Justice Blackmun concurred in the judg-
ment because the Court's solution to the confrontation dilemma was
satisfactory. 122 Justice Blackmun maintained that in camera review
would adequately identify and disclose any material statements
made by Ritchie's daughter that could be used to impeach her credi-
because there might have been a more effective means of cross-examination." Id. at
1005 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 1005 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
115 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20 (per
curiam)(emphasis in original)).
116 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
117 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
118 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). The witness in Davis was on probation for the same
crime that Davis was accused of committing. The Court recognized that the witness
might alter his testimony in an attempt to divert attention from his own criminal history.
Davis, 415 U.S. at 313-14.
119 Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. The Davis Court concluded that because the defendant was
not permitted to refer to the witness' juvenile record, the "[p]etitioner was thus denied
the right of effective cross-examination." Id.
120 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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bility.' 23 Furthermore, he observed that the in camera review would
be an ongoing process to identify material evidence that was origi-
nally thought to be insignificant.124
VI. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Brennan dissented from the plurality's conclusion that
the confrontation clause applies only to events occurring at trial. 125
Justice Brennan's criticism of the plurality was based on his belief
that events outside of trial could equally infringe upon the right of
cross-examination.' 26 The trial court's denial of access to prior
statements made by the daughter, according to the dissent, deprived
Ritchie of information crucial to witness impeachment and therefore
violated his rights under the confrontation clause. 127
Justice Brennan initially identified the Court's historic under-
standing that the confrontation clause guarantees the right to cross-
examination.' 28 Although restricting a line of inquiry at trial may be
one way of impairing the right to cross-examine, Justice Brennan
suggested that the confrontation clause does not exclusively address
such restrictions.1 29 The dissent emphasized that a denial of access
to important information would hamper defense counsel's ability to
pursue lines of interrogation at trial.' 30 Foreclosing lines of inquiry
through nondisclosure, Justice Brennan explained, interferes with
counsel's ability to cross-examine as much as restrictions imposed
by the trial court.' 3 ' He argued that, in fact, the Court had already
held that the right of cross-examination may be infringed by events
123 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun warned lower courts reviewing
confidential records to be particularly sensitive to the existence of impeachment evi-
dence because the failure to identify such evidence "would undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion.
126 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan conceded, however, that the trial
court properly rejected Ritchie's general assertion that the file as a whole might contain
useful evidence and that it rightfully denied complete access to the file. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
128 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)). See
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985)(per curiam).
129 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan attacked the
plurality's use of statements from California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970), and
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968), to support its restricted view of the confronta-
tion clause. Neither case, in Justice Brennan's estimation, addressed the possibility of
applying the clause to events outside of the trial. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
130 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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occurring outside the scope of trial. 132 InJencks v. United States,133
the Court ruled that the defendant should be given access to previ-
ous statements made by prosecution witnesses to government
agents. 34 Justice Brennan observed that in accordance withJencks,
defendants are entitled to inspect materials that relate to the wit-
ness' testimony.13 5 He criticized the plurality's insistence that coun-
sel be restricted at trial from pursuing a specific line of inquiry to
establish a confrontation violation, because without prior access to
the file, counsel could not identify the subjects of inquiry foreclosed
from examination at trial.' 3 6 The Court's holding, Justice Brennan
concluded, would recognize confrontation clause violations only in
situations in which there was a partial denial of access but not when
defense counsel was absolutely denied access.' 37
The dissent argued that Davis v. Alaska,'38 although focusing
primarily on the restriction at trial, did not indicate "that an in-
fringement on the right to cross-examination could occur only in
that context."' 1 9 Justice Brennan examined Davis and noted that
although the immediate barrier to cross-examination was the trial
judge's restriction of defense counsel inquiries into the juvenile po-
lice record, the underlying impediment was the statutory prohibi-
tion on disclosure of such records. 40 He explained that "It]he
132 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
134 Id. at 668-69. The Court contended that such access was critical because the de-
fendant's ability to impeach witnesses against him was "singularly important," and the
reports were crucial to the impeachment effort. Id. at 667.
135 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan indicated that
althoughJencks was decided on non-constitutional grounds," 'it would be idle to say that
the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision.'"
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959)(Brennan, J., concurring)).
136 Id. at 1007-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan additionally argued that
the Court's decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), demonstrates that
pre-trial events may disturb the right of cross-examination. Id. at 1008 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Wade, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to the presence of
counsel at a pre-trial lineup "to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial as affected
by his right to meaningfully cross-examine the witnesses against him." Wade, 388 U.S. at
227. If counsel were not present to observe any unfairness at the lineup, Justice Bren-
nan explained, the defendant may lose his only significant opportunity to attack the
credibility of the witness' identification. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)(citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 232). Because counsel would be precluded from develop-
ing a line of inquiry at trial based upon the denial of pre-trial access, Justice Brennan
concluded that Wade dictates a different conclusion than the plurality advocated. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
137 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
139 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
140 Id. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Brennan agreed with the
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creation of [such] a significant impediment to the conduct of cross-
examination thus undercuts the protections of the Confrontation
Clause, even if that impediment is not erected at the trial itself."' 41
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the denial of access to prior
statements imposed a significant handicap on the defendant's ability
to confront the witness by depriving him of information crucial to
his ability to conduct cross-examinination. t 42
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the due process clause,
rather than the confrontation clause, would not provide a better
mechanism for providing the defendant access to material informa-
tion because "due process analysis requires that information be
evaluated by the trial judge, not defense counsel."' 143 A neutral trial
judge, Justice Brennan argued, may be unable to recognize the ma-
teriality of prior statements if the trial judge does not recognize
their subtle potential for impeaching a witness.144 Justice Brennan
pointed out that theJencks Court held that defense counsel should
examine the statements " '[b]ecause only the defense is adequately
equipped to determine the effective use for the purpose of discredit-
ing the Government's witness and thereby firthering the accused's
defense.'"145 In conclusion, Justice Brennan maintained that
"while Confrontation Clause and due process analysis may in some
cases be congruent, the Confrontation Clause has independent sig-
nificance in protecting against infringements on the right to cross-
examination." 146
VII. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens contended that
the Court lacked proper jurisdiction. 147 Justice Stevens observed
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the true problemfor the defendant in Davis "was the
prohibition on disclosure ofjuvenile records." Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1009 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
142 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that a witness' prior state-
ments are critical to any impeachment effort. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
667 (1957). He also contended that "[t]he right of a defendant to confront an accuser is
intended fundamentally to provide an opportunity to subject accusations to critical scru-
tiny" and that in order to test such accusations, it is essential to compare witness' testi-
mony with earlier statements. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct at 1009 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)(emphasis in original). See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)(confron-
tation clause's "underlying purpose [is] to augment accuracy in the factfinding process
by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence").
143 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quotingJencks, 353 U.S. at 668-69).
146 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1009-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia
joined Justice Stevens in dissent.
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that the Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that "may
only review '[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State.' "148 He noted that this limitation serves "notions
of efficiency, judicial restraint and federalism."' 149 The Court's ad-
herence to this policy of strict finality, Justice Stevens explained, has
resulted in the Court's refusal to review countless cases that have
otherwise ended in settlement or termination of litigation.150 Jus-
tice Stevens acknowledged, however, that the Court has recognized
certain exceptions to the finality principle.151 In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,152 the Court maintained that one such exception exists
"where the federal claim has been finally decided with further pro-
ceedings in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the
federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
case."
1 53
Justice Stevens, after examining the various procedural scena-
rios that might occur if the Court declined further review, deter-
mined that Ritchie did not properly fit within the Cox Broadcasting
exception. 154 The dissent maintained that the commonwealth could
148 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)).
149 Id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542, 550 (1963)(policy against fragmented and prolonged litigation not implicated
when national labor policy would be furthered); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson,
326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945) (Finality "avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed
justice.").
150 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 481 (1975)).
152 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
153 Id. at 481. Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he concern, of course, is that the peti-
tioning party not be put in a position where he might eventually lose on the merits, but
would have never had an opportunity to present his federal claims for review." Ritchie,
107 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 481). The
most frequent example of this scenario arises, Justice Stevens explained, when a state
appeals an appellate court's order to suppress evidence. In such a case, if the state was
forced to proceed to trial before subsequent review, it might lose on the merits and be
barred from further appeals by the double jeopardy clause. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 n.1 (1984)(procdeural posture in which
federal issue cannot be reviewed regardless of outcome in state court falls under Cox
Broadcasting exception).
154 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained
that in the first scenario, CYS "might refuse to produce the documents under penalty of
contempt, in which case appeals could be taken, and this Court could obtain proper
jurisdiction." Id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the second scenario, if CYS dis-
closed the records, the trial court might find the error to be harmless and uphold
Ritchie's conviction. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In that event, Justice Stevens com-
mented, "the Commonwealth would not have been harmed by our having declined to
review the case at this stage." Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Finally, in the last scenario, if
the trial court determined that the nondisclosure was prejudicial and ordered a new
trial, under Pennsylvania law the commonwealth could obtain an immediate interlocu-
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not lose the case on federal constitutional grounds without an op-
portunity to appeal the issue to the Supreme Court. 155 Further-
more, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's preference for
Supreme Court review before disclosure of the file rendered its con-
fidentiality moot because this preference contradicted the Court's
long-standing tradition of avoiding constitutional issues if the case
can be disposed of on nonconstitutional grounds. 56 The Court's
policy against hearing unnecessary constitutional claims, he con-
cluded, "demands strict application of the finality requirement."' 57
Justice Stevens criticized the majority's contention that immedi-
ate Supreme Court review was needed to prevent the sacrifice of the
commonwealth's interest in confidentiality. 158 Instead, he cited the
Court's well-established rule of granting the party objecting to dis-
closure the option to refuse production of the requested documents
if that party believes the disclosure will be harmful and to appeal
immediately any resulting contempt orders. 159 Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the requisite conditions for hppellate review did not ex-
ist because CYS had not yet been given the opportunity to choose
between complying with the court order or being held in contempt
of court. 16 0
tory appeal of the new trial order. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN., PA. R.A.P., Rule 31 1(a) (5) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
Justice Stevens also contended that the commonwealth had the opportunity to reas-
sert its constitutional claim in the Pennsylvania courts. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1011 (Ste-
vens J., dissenting). He acknowledged that although the Pennsylvania courts would
reject the claim in accordance with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Com-
monwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 502 A.2d 148 (1985), the United States Supreme
Court would still be able to review the issue. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1011 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 946 (1983)(claim properly before
Court when highest state court refused to reconsider its previous decision on earlier
appeal); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1982)(The state supreme court's
"subseqent reliance on the law of the case cannot prevent us from reviewing federal
questions determined in the first appeal.").
155 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1011 (StevensJ, dissenting).
156 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 571
(1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
157 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1011 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Republic Natural Gas Co.
v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1948)).
158 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that this rule was used in United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971), a case in which the district court denied a motion to
quash a subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents located in Kenya. The
Court ultimately ruled that the order was non-appealable and argued that if the sub-
poena was as unduly burdensome as claimed, the party may refuse to comply and risk
being held in contempt of court. Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532-33. See Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940)("Whatever right [the witness] may have requires no
further protection.., than that afforded by the district court until the witness chooses to
disobey and is committed for contempt.").
160 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1012 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasized
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Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's assertion that be-
cause the case had been tried and appealed, an immediate review
would expedite the conclusion of the case. 16 1 Justice Stevens con-
tended that had the Court not granted certiorari, the trial court
might have already disposed of the case. 162 Because litigants would
interrupt lower court proceedings with time-consuming interlocu-
tory appeals, Justice Stevens concluded that a case-by-case assess-
ment of finality would ultimately lead to greater inefficiencies.1 63
VIII. ANALYSIS
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In Ritchie, the plurality misinterpreted the scope of the confron-
tation clause in holding that the defendant's rights were not violated
by CYS' refusal to comply with the subpoena. Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the plurality, maintained that the confrontation clause
should be narrowly construed.'6 He contended that the clause
merely affords the defendant a "trial" right to cross-examination.1 65
Moreover, Justice Powell found that this right encompasses only the
opportunity for cross-examination rather than the effectiveness of
the opportunity.' 66 Justice Powell's analysis, unfortunately, reflects
a rather short-sighted view of the confrontation clause. To ignore
the effects of pre-trial events on the scope of cross-examination or
to limit the defendant's right strictly to an opportunity to confront
witnesses against him, would indeed render the confrontation
clause an "empty formality."1 67
Justice Powell narrowly interpreted the Court's decision in Da-
vis v. Alaska 168 in his conclusion "that the right of confrontation is a
that a relaxation of the finality requirement in this case would be especially inappropri-
ate as CYS was not a party to the case. Id. at n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He acknowl-
edged that the Court has recognized a limited exception to the rule if the documents are
held by a third party without an independent interest in the documents' confidentiality.
Id. at n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
However, he distinguished Ritchie because a third party, namely CYS, asserted the inter-
est in the documents' confidentiality. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1012 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
161 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1013 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 998-1000 (plurality opinion).
165 Id. at 999 (plurality opinion).
166 Id. (plurality opinion).
167 See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
168 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 54-56 for a description of
the Court's holding in Davis.
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trial right."' 69 In Davis, the trial court, pursuant to a state statute,
issued a pre-trial protective order prohibiting any reference to a key
witness' juvenile police record. 170 The Davis Court concluded that
this prohibition prevented defense counsel from adequately demon-
strating to the jury the witness' source of bias. 171 The Court stated:
On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effec-
tive, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury
the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility,
could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the
witness. Petitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-exami-
nation. .... 172
Justice Powell rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's view
that under Davis a statutory privilege was less important than the
defendant's need for pre-trial access to information which might be
used to impeach the witness. 17 The effect of such a broad interpre-
tation, he maintained, "would be to transform the Confrontation
Clause into a constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discov-
ery."' 174 Justice Powell, therefore, concluded that Ritchie's sixth
amendment rights would have been violated by a court-imposed re-
striction of cross-examination at trial rather than by the denial of
access to CYS files before trial. 175
However, Justice Powell mistakenly believed that the restriction
of cross-examination in Davis occurred exclusively at trial. Although
the effect of the restriction rendered defense counsel unable to
question the witness directly on his source of bias, the restriction
emanated from the pre-trial order.176 This pre-trial order pre-
vented defense counsel from providing the jurors with evidence that
169 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
170 Davis, 415 U.S. at 311. Despite the court-imposed restriction, defense counsel at-
tempted to expose the witness' potential bias without specific reference to the police
record. Id. at 312.
171 Id. at 318.
172 Id. Justice Powell contended that the error in Davis was not that the records were
confidential but that the defendant was denied the opportunity to expose to the jury
circumstances from which they might infer that the witness was unreliable. Id. at 1000
(plurality opinion)(citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
173 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that the confidentiality of the files was less important than "a defendant's
right to effectively confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him." Common-
wealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985). Furthermore, the court
declared "that it would be absurd to read the statute as providing that the records be
made available to a court of competent jurisdiction, while denying any use of them to
the litigants in a criminal case before such courts." Id., 502 A.2d at 153.
174 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion).
175 Id. at 1000 (plurality opinion).
176 See Davis, 415 U.S. at 311. The prosecution ultimately objected to defense coun-
sel's line of inquiry not on the grounds that the defense violated the pre-trial order, but
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might have allowed them to infer the witness' bias just as effectively
as if the trial court had restricted defense counsel's inquiries at the
time of cross-examination. 177 Davis demonstrates that the distinc-
tion between pre-trial and trial events is meaningless because pre-
trial events can be as restrictive on the ability to cross-examine as is
a restriction imposed at trial.' 78 As Justice Brennan argued,
"[w]hile Davis focused most explicitly on the restriction at trial of
cross-examination, nothing in the opinion indicated that an in-
fringement on the right to cross-examination could occur only in
that context."' 179 In short, the pre-trial/trial distinction announced
by Justice Powell does not logically follow from the Court's decision
in Davis.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, contended that the
similarities between Davis and Ritchie outweigh any differences. 180
In both cases defense counsel was prevented from referring to spe-
cific facts that might have suggested the bias of a critical witness. 181
Whether the restriction occurred at or before trial, the defense was
effectively prohibited from pursuing lines of inquiry during cross-
examination. Therefore, the Ritchie plurality should have recog-
nized a sixth amendment violation on the same grounds as the viola-
tion was found in Davis. Justice Blackmun acknowledged, however,
that the cases were technically different because the defense in Davis
had access to the prohibited records. 182 He noted that Davis was
restricted at trial from pursuing an available line of inquiry while
Ritchie's pre-trial preparation was hindered by the nondisclosure of
potentially useful information.1 8 3 Rejecting this distinction, Justice
rather because defense counsel's repeated questions merely rehashed prior cross-exami-
nation. Id. at 312-13. The trial court sustained the prosecution's objections. Id. at 313.
177 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178 Cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973)("This extension of the right to
counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns of criminal procedure
and investigation that have tended to generate pre-trial events that might appropriately
be considered to be parts of the trial itself."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967)(presence of counsel at pre-trial identification lineup necessary "to preserve the
defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-ex-
amine the witnesses against him").
179 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original). Justice
Brennan noted in his dissent that this distinction "ignores the fact that the right of cross-
examination also may be significantly infringed by events occurring outside of trial it-
self." Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 1005 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
181 Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Brennan suggested that although the imme-
diate barrier in Davis was the trial judge's order, the underlying reason for the restriction
was the state statute prohibiting its use in trial. Id. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
183 Id. 1005-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Blackmun stated:
I do not believe, however, that a State can avoid Confrontation Clause
problems simply by deciding to hinder the defendant's right to effec-
tive cross-examination, on the basis of a desire to protect the confiden-
tiality interests of a particular class of individuals, at the pretrial, rather
than at the trial, stage. i8 4
Justice Powell also erroneously concluded that the case law es-
tablishes that the right to confrontation is a trial right. To support
his proposition, he cited dicta from earlier Court decisions.' 85 For
instance, he quoted from California v. Green,'8 6 in which the Court
stated that "it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confronta-
tion Clause."'18 7 The Green Court held that the introduction of a wit-
ness' out-of-court statements was permissible at trial because the
witness was subject to cross-examination both at the time the state-
ments were made and at trial. 188 Green did not indicate, as Justice
Powell alleged, that the right to cross-examination was implicated
solely at trial. 189 Similarly, Justice Powell misconstrued the Court's
decision in Barber v. Page,190 which declared that "[t]he right to con-
frontation is basically a trial right."''1 The Barber Court held that
the admission of out-of-court testimony of an allegedly unavailable
witness violated the confrontation clause absent "a good faith effort
to obtain his presence at trial."192 In dicta, the Court indicated that
even when defense counsel cross-examines a witness at a prelimi-
nary hearing, the scope of such a hearing is too limited to satisfy the
demands of the confrontation clause.' 93 This dicta does not author-
184 Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
185 See id. at 999 (plurality opinion).
186 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
187 Id. at 151.
188 Id. at 158.
189 The Court's decisions have established that pre-trial cross-examination can satisfy
the confrontation clause. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1980)(admission of
out-of-court testimony of unavailable witness did not violate the confrontation clause in
situation in which defense counsel had adequate opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness at pre-trial hearing); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965)(confrontation
clause was violated when the defendant was denied "a complete and adequate opportu-
nity to cross-examine an unavailable witness" at a pre-trial hearing). For a discussion of
the quality of cross-examination necessary to satisfy the confrontation clause, see infra
text accompanying notes 204-11.
190 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
191 Id. at 725.
192 Id. at 724-26. The Court rejected the state's assertion that the defendant waived
his right to confront when he declined to cross-examine the witness at a preliminary
hearing. Id. at 725.
193 Id. at 725. However, the Barber Court acknowledged that "there may be some
justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a pre-
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itatively conclude, however, that the effects of pre-trial events have
no bearing on a defendant's confrontation clause rights. Justice
Brennan, after examining Green and Barber, concurred that neither
"address[ed] the question of whether Confrontation Clause rights
may be implicated by events outside of trial." 194
After concluding that the right to confront was basically a trial
right, Justice Powell indicated that the scope of this right is satisfied
whenever "defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to ques-
tion witnesses." 195  In his view, accordingly, the confrontation
clause should provide the defendant an opportunity for cross-exam-
ination rather than serve as a basis for scrutinizing the effectiveness
of cross-examination. 96 In support of this proposition, Justice
Powell cited the Court's decision in Delaware v. Fensterer,'9 7 in which
the Court declared that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish."' 198
In his concurrence, however, Justice Blackmun argued that such
a conclusion is questionable. He stated that by "divorc[ing] con-
frontation analysis from any examination into the effectiveness of
cross-examination ... in some situations the confrontation right
would become an empty formality."' 1 9 Justice Blackmun recog-
nized that the plurality's reliance on the above-quoted remark from
liminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is
shown to be actually unavailable." Id. at 725-26. The Court has recognized instances in
which pre-trial cross-examination satisfies the confrontation clause. See supra note 189.
194 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Powell
contended that the Court's decision in Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)(per
curiam), reaffirmed his view of the confrontation clause when it rejected the defendant's
claim in the absence of a court-imposed restriction at trial. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000
(plurality opinion). Nothing in Fensterer, however, would suggest that the Court in-
tended to exclude pre-trial events from coverage under the confrontation clause. See
supra note 49 for a discussion of the Court's decision in Fensterer.
195 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (plurality opinion).
196 See id.
197 474 U.S. 15 (1985)(per curiam).
198 Id. at 20 (per curiam)(emphasis in original). The plurality, concluded that Fensterer
"was in full accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause
infringement claim on this issue only when there was a specific statutory or court-im-
posed restriction at trial on the scope of questioning." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000 (plu-
rality opinion). Justice Powell cited numerous cases for the proposition that the clause
merely protects the defendant's right to confrontation from statutory or court-imposed
restrictions at trial. Id. at n.10 (plurality opinion). None of these cases, however, ex-
pressly hold that the confrontation clause guarantee is strictly limited to these circum-
stances. But see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 125
(1974)("[Tlhe right of confrontation is exclusively a 'trial right' ")(quoting Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)).
199 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
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Fensterer was misguided. 200 The remark can be read to imply that the
confrontation clause provides an opportunity for effective cross-ex-
amination rather than, as Justice Powell asserted, the mere opportu-
nity to confront a witness without regard for the potential
effectiveness of that confrontation. 20 1 Justice Blackmun chose the
former interpretation and explained that "it means... when, as in
Fensterer, simple questioning serves the purpose of cross-examina-
tion, a defendant cannot claim a confrontation violation because
there might have been a more effective means of cross-examina-
tion." 20 2 The necessity for inquiries into the potential effectiveness
of confrontation opportunities is demonstrated by cases such as Da-
vis, in which the physical opportunity to question a witness existed
but was insufficient. 203
Although the Court has never expressly held that there must be
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, this position has
been strongly implied.20 4 The Court in Davis, for instance, after an-
alyzing the defendant's limited ability to cross-examine the juvenile
witness, concluded that the "[p]etitioner was thus denied the right
of effective cross-examination." 20 5 Justice Blackmun explained that
in Davis simple questioning without reference to the privileged ma-
terial would be tantamount to no cross-examination at all.2 0 6 Simi-
larly, in Smith v. Illinois,207 the Court held that the defendant had a
right under the confrontation clause to ask a witness for his true
identity for the purpose of impeaching the latter's testimony.208
200 Id. at 1005 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201 See id. at 999 (plurality opinion).
202 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun contended that in Fensterer, the
defendant, through simple questioning, had an opportunity for effective cross-examina-
tion. Id. at 1004-05 (Blackmun,J., concurring). This is not to say, however, thatJustice
Blackmun intended that there be a confrontation clause issue whenever a defendant,
who had an opportunity for effective confrontation, failed to take advantage of that op-
portunity. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
203 See id at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Davis, the defendant could question
the witness regarding his possible bias, but, without reference to the protected record,
the defendant could not effectively undermine the witness' credibility. Davis, 415 U.S.
308, 318 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 54-56 for an analysis of Davis.
204 See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
205 Davis, 415 U.S. at 318.
206 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Cf. United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)("[W]e scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to
determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's
basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the wit-
ness against him.") (emphasis in original).
207 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
208 Id. at 131. As in Davis, the credibility of the witness in Smith was of primary impor-
tance. Id. at 130. The Court found that although the defendant could still cross-ex-
amine, disclosure of the witness' true identity in Smith was the critical starting point for
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The Smith Court argued that "[t]o forbid this most rudimentary in-
quiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-
examination itself."20 9 Finally, the Court in Fensterer stated that "the
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is
given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmi-
ties through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of
the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' tes-
timony." 210 As the facts of Davis, Smith and Ritchie demonstrate, the
mere opportunity to cross-examine a witness does not necessarily
provide the jury with the requisite information with which to ques-
tion a witness' credibility. Dismissal of any considerations of the po-
tential effectiveness of cross-examination would surely render the
right of confrontation a hollow promise. 211
B. IN CAMERA REVIEW
The majority in Ritchie accurately concluded that the defendant
was entitled to have the CYS files reviewed for "material" evi-
dence. 2 12 Justice Powell, after weighing the competing interests, ju-
discovering falsehoods in the testimony through "in-court examination and out-of-court
investigation." Id. at 131. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692-93 (1931)(de-
fendant entitled to request a witness' place of residence because such information was
essential "to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony
and his credibility to a test").
209 Smith, 390 U.S. at 131.
210 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)(per curiam)(emphasis added).
211 But see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the Court held that the
admission of out-of-court testimony did not violate the confrontation clause in a situa-
tion in which the evidence was sufficiently reliable. Id. at 73. Justice Blackmun, writing
for the Roberts Court stated in dicta that "in all but such extraordinary cases, no inquiry
into 'effectiveness' is required." Id. at n.12. This language, however, should not be
construed to mean that the confrontation right is unconnected to inquiries into effec-
tiveness. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), in which the Court examined the
effectiveness of an unavailable witness' testimony at an earlier trial to determine if the
transcript provided reliable testimony. Significantly, Justice Blackmun has since taken a
firm stand in his concurring opinion in Ritchie, supporting the opposite conclusion.
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra notes 107-24 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. Further-
more, Roberts is a hearsay case and can be distinguished from Ritchie because the
confrontation concern in the former stems from the defendant's inability to confront his
accusers. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64. But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)("There is no good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not vio-
lated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testi-
fying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination."). Finally, the
concern in non-hearsay cases focuses not on the actual ability to confront the witness,
but upon whether restrictions placed on the defense preclude "expos[ing] to the jury
the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the relia-
bility of the witness." Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. For a discussion of the categories of con-
frontation clause cases, see supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
212 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003-04. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)("[I]f
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diciously determined that only an in camera review by the trial court
would protect Ritchie's right to a fair trial while preserving the
state's interest in the confidentiality of its child abuse files. The
Court's decision, however, provides a trial court with great discre-
tion in conducting its in camera review, as the search will be per-
formed exclusively by the trial court without the benefit of an
advocate's perspective. 21 3 Although future defendants are denied
the advantages of their attorney's expertise in ferreting out informa-
tion, Ritchie will provide defendants with a needed mechanism for
compelling a court review of privileged or confidential information
for useful evidence.214
The in camera compromise is well supported by the decisions
of numerous courts.2 15 In United States v. Nixon,216 the Court con-
cluded that the President's generalized interest in the confidentiality
of his records could not supersede "the fundamental demands of
due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." 2 17
The district court was entrusted to review the material in camera to
determine if there existed evidence that met "the test of admissibil-
ity and relevance. '218 Although Nixon did not provide the frame-
work for Justice Powell's analysis in Ritchie, the Court in both cases
the subject matter.., is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality
exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the
information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge."); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963)("[Sjuppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or pun-
ishment .... ").
213 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003. See State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 459, 464 A.2d
829, 833 (1983)(quoting State v. Pikorski, 177 Conn. 736, 677, 419 A.2d 866, 895-96,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979) ("[I]n the case of admissibility of such records, however,
access to such [records] must be left to the discretion of the trial court which is better
able to assess the probative value of such evidence as it relates to the particular case
before it.' ").
214 The Supreme Court of Minnesota adopted the Ritchie rationale in State v. Paradee,
403 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1987). The court stated that "[t]he in camera approach strikes a
fairer balance between the interest of the privilege holder in having his confidences kept
and the interest of the criminal defendant in obtaining all relevant evidence that might
help in his defense. Id. at 642. The court added "that it is not our intent to complicate
or change the discovery process in criminal cases" and that the decision was consistent
with the state's policy for broad discovery. Id.
215 The use of an in camera procedure in the context of rape and sexual assault cases
has been advocated by several of the highest state courts. See, e.g., In Re Robert H., 199
Conn. 693, 509 A.2d 475 (1976); People v. Coates, 109 Il. 2d 431, 488 N.E.2d 247
(1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1474 (1986); Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass.
261, 491 N.E.2d 234 (1986); State v. Daniels, 1 Ohio St. 3d 69, 437 N.E.2d 1186 (1982).
216 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
217 Id. at 713.
218 Id. at 714. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959) ("[Wle approve
the practice of having the Government submit the [written out-of-court] statement [of a
witness] to the trial judge for an in camera determination.").
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chose to permit the disclosure of some information without compro-
mising the confidentiality of the entire body of information. 219 Ad-
ditionally, the Court in both Nixon and Ritchie concluded that the
trial court could adequately determine the materiality of informa-
tion in voluminous files without the assistance of an "eye of an
advocate."220
The strongest argument favoring full disclosure of CYS records
to the defendant was the denial of the opportunity "to have the files
reviewed with the eyes and the perspective of an advocate." 221 The
Supreme Court had previously stated in Dennis v. United States222 that
"[t]he determination of what may be useful to the defense can prop-
erly and effectively be made only by an advocate." 223 However, as
Justice Brennan acknowledged in his dissent, a generalized request
to search the files for information that might be useful provides "an
insufficient basis for permitting general access to the file." 224 The
Court has looked unfavorably upon requests for disclosure in order
219 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 714-16. Compare Rovario v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)(prejudicial error to permit the government to withhold the
identity of its informant if the informant's possible testimony would be relevant and
useful to the defense) with McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)(no need to reveal an
informant's name at a pre-trial hearing if the lack of disclosure did not deny the defend-
ant his sixth amendment rights).
Rovario implicitly advocates the disclosure of the complete file directly to the de-
fendant. Cases such as Nixon and Ritchie, however, can be distinguished from Rovario.
Unlike Rovario, the administration ofjustice in these two cases could still be adequately
achieved without disclosure of confidential information that had no bearing on the out-
come of the proceedings. In Rovario, the right to a fair trial depended on the disclosure
of the complete body of confidential information which was the witness' name. Rovario,
343 U.S. at 56-58.
220 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 714-16. The Court in Ritchie rejected
the need for defense counsel's participation in the in camera review but noted that the
defendant could make specific requests for known information and argue its materiality.
Furthermore, the majority stressed that the trial court's duty to review was ongoing so
that information originally thought to be immaterial might eventually be properly dis-
closed. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003.
221 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985).
222 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
223 Id. at 875. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to examine the grand
jury testimony of four government witnesses where the interest of confidentiality of
grand jury proceedings was minimal. Id. at 874-75. See also Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969)("[a]n apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a refer-
ence to what appears to be a neutral person or event... may have special significance to
one who knows the more intimate facts" and "may be wholly colorless and devoid of
meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances"); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957)(defendant is entitled to inspect reports submitted
by government witnesses "[b]ecause only the defense is adequately equipped to deter-
mine the effective use for the purpose of discrediting the Government's witness").
224 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to allow a party to conduct "fishing expeditions." 225 In Palermo v.
United States, 226 the Court approved the use of in camera review,
contending that the "[flinal decision as to production must rest...
within the good sense and experience of the district judge.' 227 Be-
cause the ultimate decision of admissibility lies with the trial court,
that court should be able to competently determine the probative
value of the evidence and the subsequent need for disclosure to the
defendant. 228 Furthermore, as Justice Powell recognized, the duty
to review the files is ongoing so that information originally thought
to be immaterial might eventually be disclosed. 229
Justice Powell might have reduced the pressures placed on the
trial court when conducting its in camera review had he adopted the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's approach of focusing exclusively on
the disclosure of prior inconsistent statements. 230 The Pennsylvania
Superior Court instructed the trial court to limit its in camera review
to the daughter's out-of-court statements to determine if there ex-
isted any material inconstistencies which Ritchie could utilize to im-
peach her testimony.23 ' Justice Powell, however, shifted the scope
of the in camera review to all "material" information, placing an
225 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700. See also Camitsch v. Risley, 705 F.2d 351, 353 (9th
Cir. 1983) (defendant convicted of sexual assault of minors not constitutionally entitled
to "rummage through the otherwise confidential case files of every juvenile witness").
226 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
227 Id. at 363.
228 See State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987)("We believe that trial
courts, who by training and experience are qualified for the task of determining matters
of relevancy, are capable of determining what if any of the information in the records
might help in the defense."); State v. Storlazzi, 191 Conn. 453, 459, 469 A.2d 829, 833
(1983)(review of records should be left to the trial court which is in the best position to
measure the probative value of the evidence).
229 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003. The Court in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855
(1966), criticized the use of an in camera review of grand jury testimony and concluded
that" 'it would be extremely difficult for even the most able and experienced trial judge
under the pressures of conducting a trial to pick out all of the grand jury testimony that
would be useful in impeaching a witness.'" Id. at 874 (quoting Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 410 (1959)(Brennan, J., dissenting)). In Ritchie, the
trial court admitted that over 50 pages of a voluminous record were not reviewed at the
time of the trial. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995 n.3. There is at least some justifiable criticism,
therefore, that a trial court could not adequately perform the ongoing review advocated
by Justice Powell. See infra note 234 and accompanying text for contrary analysis.
230 See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. 557, 567-68, 472 A.2d 220, 226
(1984). Justice Blackmun focused on impeachment evidence but concurred in judgment
because the majority's proscribed review for material information "would certainly in-
clude such evidence as statements of the witness that might have been used to impeach
her testimony by demonstrating any bias towards respondent or by revealing inconsis-
tencies in her prior statements." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. at 567-68, 472 A.2d at 226. Unfortu-
nately, the Pennsylvania Superior Court went beyond what was necessary in holding that
the defendant should be given full access to the files in order to argue the relevancy of
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increased burden on trial judges, who will now have to evaluate
every piece of information in the file.2 32 By limiting the search to
prior inconsistent statements, the concern that the files need be re-
viewed with the "eyes of an advocate" could have been reduced. 233
Furthermore, allegations that the trial court would be unable to per-
form an ongoing review would be minimized because the trial court
would only need to focus on comparing the trial transcript to verba-
tim statements contained in the CYS files. 234 In short, had the ma-
jority limited the in camera review to an inspection of the witness'
out-of-court statements, Ritchie might have better avoided any con-
cerns that trial courts cannot adequately protect a defendant's right
to a fair trial.
IX. CONCLUSION
In Ritchie, the plurality's narrow view of the scope of the con-
frontation clause would in many instances render it an "empty for-
mality." 23 5 The defendant's ability under the confrontation clause
to cross-examine witnesses against him cannot be inhibited if society
is to remain steadfast in its "belief that the right of confrontation
any released material. Id. at 568, 472 A.2d at 226. This step would tend to undermine
any benefit achieved from conducting the in camera review in the first place.
232 The Court's expansion to a full review for exculpatory evidence was unnecessary
in this case. Ritchie's counsel basically asked for access to specific medical records and
the names of any potential witnesses that might be contained in the file. Ritchie, 107 S.
Ct. at 994-95. Ritchie's request could easily have been satisfied by an in camera review
for these specific items in addition to the generalized search for inconsistent statements.
See id., 107 S. Ct. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("When reviewing confidential
records in future cases, trial courts should be particularly aware of the possibility that
impeachment evidence of a key prosecution witness could well constitute the sort whose
unavailability to the defendant would undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial.").
233 Justice Brennan stated in his dissent that "[t]he prospect that these statements will
not be regarded as material is enhanced by the fact that due process analysis requires
that information be evaluated by the trialjudge, not defense counsel." Ritchie, 107 S. Ct.
at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although it will always be possible that a trial judge
might fail to recognize a subtle inconsistency, the Court dismissed this risk in holding
that the state's compelling interest in confidentiality outweighed the defendant's abso-
lute right to disclosure. Id. at 1003. Justice Powell explained that the trial court would
not have unlimited discretion because "[i]f a defendant is aware of specific information
contained in the file (e.g., the medical report), he is free to request it directly from the
court." Id.
234 Compare Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969)(in camera review of
surveillance records from illegal wiretap rejected in situation in which "the task is too
complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the ... judgment of the
trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government's
case") with Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317-18 (1969)(per curiam)(in
camera review of illegal wiretaps was proper in situation in which the task was not overly
complex).
235 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal." 2 36 It is important that courts recognize that a defendant's
ability to cross-examine a witness can be affected equally by events
occurring both in and out of the courtroom. Limiting the applica-
tion of the confrontation clause to infringements occurring only at
trial makes little sense if the end result denies a defendant the op-
portunity to effectively impeach a witness' testimony during cross-
examination. Therefore, to retain the clause's vitality, courts should
examine whether a defendant's opportunity for cross-examination is
a potentially useful opportunity to expose weaknesses in a witness'
testimony. The plurality in Ritchie, however, divorced the confron-
tation clause analysis from these practical considerations. Thus, the
Court essentially laid the groundwork for an unequal and inconsis-
tent application of the confrontation clause to future defendants.
Fortunately, in Ritchie, the Court arrived at a solution that will
assure the defendant an opportunity for a fairjudgment. An in cam-
era review of the confidential files by the trial court will adequately
protect the interests of both the state and the defendant. Although
trial judges are perfectly capable of conducting such reviews, the
burden of conducting a broad search for any relevant material,
rather than a search only for inconsistent out-of-court statements,
could become substantial. Given the commonwealth's strong inter-
est in maintaining the confidentiality of such sensitive files, however,
the burden of an in camera review is the best way to secure the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.
JEFFREY M. GALKIN
236 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
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